Lawrence University

Lux
Lawrence University Honors Projects

6-1-2016

On Multiethnic Schools in Consociational
Democracies: A Comparative Analysis of Brčko
District and Bosnia-Herzegovina
Jusuf Šarančić
Lawrence University, sarancij@lawrence.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://lux.lawrence.edu/luhp
Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, Eastern European Studies Commons, Education
Policy Commons, International Relations Commons, Multicultural Psychology Commons, Peace
and Conflict Studies Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, Political Theory
Commons, Public Affairs Commons, Public Policy Commons, School Psychology Commons, Social
Influence and Political Communication Commons, Social Policy Commons, and the Social
Psychology Commons
© Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Šarančić, Jusuf, "On Multiethnic Schools in Consociational Democracies: A Comparative Analysis of Brčko District and BosniaHerzegovina" (2016). Lawrence University Honors Projects. 94.
https://lux.lawrence.edu/luhp/94

This Honors Project is brought to you for free and open access by Lux. It has been accepted for inclusion in Lawrence University Honors Projects by an
authorized administrator of Lux. For more information, please contact colette.brautigam@lawrence.edu.

On Multiethnic Schools in Consociational Democracies:
A Comparative Analysis of Brčko District and BosniaHerzegovina
By

Jusuf Sarancic
Government Department Honors Project
Lawrence University
June 1, 2016

Project Advisor
Ameya Balsekar | Government

Committee Members
Jason Brozek | Government
Peter John Thomas | Russian
Jonathan Lhost | Economics

Acronym List
BiH

Bosnia and Herzegovina

CCC

Common Core Curriculum

DPA

Dayton Peace Agreement (Dayton Peace Accords, General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina

FBiH

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

GEI

Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research

IEBL

Inter-Entity Boundary Line

IGO

Intergovernmental Organization

INGO

International Non-Governmental Organization

MoCA

Ministry of Civil Affairs

MoE

Ministry of Education

NGS

National Group of Subjects

OHR

Office of the High Representative

OSCE

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission to
BiH

PDHR

Principal Deputy High Representative
(Brčko Supervisor, the Supervisor)

PIC

Peace Implementation Council

RS

Republic of Serbia

SFRY

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

VRS

Army of Republic of Serbia

2

Map 1: Canton Map of FBiH.1

Croats In Bosnia And Herzegovina. Digital image. European Parliamentary Research
Service Blog. N.p., 8 Jan. 2014. Web. 28 Apr. 2016.
<https://epthinktank.eu/2014/01/08/croats-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina/bosniancroats2/>.
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Map 2: City Map of BiH.2

Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina political. Digital Image. Onestopmap. N.p. Web. 9
May 2016. < https://www.onestopmap.com/product/printable-vector-map-bosniaand-herzegovina-political-65/>
2
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Introduction: Fikreta’s Story
It’s another hot day. Well over a hundred degrees and the air is absolutely
stagnant. A small, rickety Volkswagen bus labors its way up the steep foothills
surrounding Mostar. The doors on the bus have been pulled open to allow air into
the cabin because there’s no air conditioning. The destination is Potkosa. It’s a tiny
village where my mom’s aunt and uncle live. Fikreta, my mom’s aunt, is a sixth grade
history and geography teacher in Stolac, which is another town about fifteen
minutes away.
The purpose of the visit is two-fold. For starters, I haven’t had a chance to
visit them during my field research in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), so it was long
overdue to visit some extended family. It is also a chance for me to interview a grade
school teacher in an ethnically divided school. So, over Turkish coffee, for the next
two hours she explains to me what it means to teach and attend a Two-in-One
school, or an ethnically divided school.
Bosnian Croat3 and Bosniak4 students will enter the school building through
opposite sides, while the teachers and school administrations enter through a joint
entrance.5 The interaction between Bosniak and Croat students is limited to before

Bosnian Croats are Croatian by descent, but were born in Bosnia. They typically
adhere to Catholicism. Going forward I will only refer to them as Croats to identify
Bosnian Croats for the purpose of simplicity.
4 Bosniaks are Bosnian Muslims. This group maintains an ethnic plurality in BiH.
Going forward I will only refer to them as Bosniaks to identify Bosnian Muslims for
the purpose of simplicity.
5 Zaklan, Fikreta. "Stolac School Teacher Interview." Personal interview. 17 Aug.
2015.
3
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and after school.6 Each ethnicity has its own curriculum, textbooks, classrooms,
teachers, administrations, lunch periods, recesses, and custodians.7 “There are two
different schools under one roof,”8 said Fikreta. She clarifies that her school is not
the only one that has this particular program, but also that each of the three
constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats, and Bosnian Serbs9) has their own education
system with curriculums, textbooks, and teachers.10
As we continued talking about the education system in BiH, she became
increasingly frustrated with how the political elites have been treating the matter.
She explains that “increasingly education has become a political issue and it is the
children who are suffering.”11 When I ask her to explain why education is a political
issue, she simply responded with “that’s just the way it is.”12 Now, I am the kind of
person who doesn’t really question people, but I couldn’t leave it at that. For the
remainder of our conversation I would try to get her to explain her response, but
she felt very content with her answer. She just kept saying, “That’s just the way it
is.”13 Her response left me feeling very uneasy and dissatisfied about the whole
interview.

Ibid.
Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Bosnian Serbs are Serbian by descent, but were born in Bosnia. They typically
adhere to Orthodox Christianity. Going forward I will only refer to them as Serbs to
identify Bosnian Serbs for the purpose of simplicity.
10 Zaklan, Fikreta. "Stolac School Teacher Interview." Personal interview. 17 Aug.
2015.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
6
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After we finished, I gave my great aunt a big hug, a kiss on the cheek, and
thanked her for her time. She wished me well and made me promise I would call
when I got back to Mostar safely. I headed out the door and into the scorching late
afternoon heat to catch the next rickety bus back into town.
Many days passed by until Fikreta’s uneasy answer finally settled in my
mind. It all came down to thinking critically about how the education systems came
to be and why each ethnic group maintains autonomy over their education system.
It is the result of a consociational government, or an ethnic power-sharing
democracy, created by the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). Consociationalism is a
form of proportional power-sharing government that emphasizes ethnic autonomy
within the greater decentralized federal state.14 For example, in BiH the state is
responsible for matters related to international politics and trade, taxation, and the
military.15 All other responsibilities are reserved for each of the three constituent
peoples, so responsibilities like education, police, agriculture, and tourism.16
So when I asked Fikreta why education is a political issue and she responded
with “that’s just the way it is,”17 she was being very sincere with me. Ethnicity and
politics are so closely linked together within a consociational democracy because
Lijphart, Arend. “The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy.” The Architecture of
Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy. Ed. Andrew
Reynolds. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Print.
15 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Annex 4,
Article3, Section 1. 30 Nov. 1995. Web. July 2015.
<http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BA_951121_DaytonAgr
eement.pdf>.
16 Ibid. Annex 4, Article 3, Section 3, Point A.
17 Zaklan, Fikreta. "Stolac School Teacher Interview." Personal interview. 17 Aug.
2015.
14
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ethnic groups are the source of sovereignty.18 In Stolac, and almost all of BiH, there
is no unified education system where all students of all groups learn together from a
single unbiased textbook and curriculum because there is ethnic autonomy within
the state. Naturally, coordination between ethnic groups is encouraged, but is not
mandated. If they want to work together they can and if they don’t want to then they
don’t have to.
This is why in the short-term a consociational government has a better
likelihood at stopping ethnic conflict because it is more likely for the various ethnic
groups to agree on a system where they are able to self-govern. However,
consociational governments in the long-term do not promote political moderation,
as there are little institutionalized incentives to do so.19 There are no real incentives
for political parties to gain votes outside of their ethnic group. 20 The result is
institutionalized extremism and what academics like Valery Perry call, a “frozen
conflict.”21
In the case of BiH, this institutionalized extremism has manifested itself in
the country’s education system. The political elites have no incentives to unify their
Ghai, Yash Pal. “Constitutional Asymmetries: Communal Representation,
Federalism, and Cultural Autonomy.” The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional
Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy. Ed. Andrew Reynolds. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002. 149. Print.
19 Hulsey, John. "Electoral Accountability in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the
Dayton Framework Agreement." International Peacekeeping (2015): 1-16. 30 Oct.
2015. Web. 14 Mar. 2016. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2015.1100081>.
20 Ibid.
21 Perry, Valery. Policy Note 10: Countering the Cultivation of Extremism in Bosnia
and Herzegovina: The Case for Comprehensive Education Reform. Democratization
Policy Council, Sep. 2015. 15-16. Web. Jun. 2015. <
http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/uimages/DPC%20Policy%20Note%2010%
20Extremism%20and%20Education%20in%20BiH.pdf>
18
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education systems, so they try to make their own education system unique from the
others.22 As a result, the educational content severely diverges when it comes to the
national group of subjects (NGS), which includes history, geography, language, and
the arts. Every child has a right to an education; they have a right to learn in their
own ethnicity’s language, and to learn their own ethnicity’s courses in the NGS.23 As
a result of the institutionalized autonomy and lack of incentives to gain electoral
support across ethnic lines, it makes sense that each group would have their own
education system. However, it is interesting that one district in northeastern BiH,
Brčko, has a multiethnic education system with a unified curriculum in which all
three languages are utilized in the classroom along with the three different
ethnically biased textbooks, and students belonging to all ethnicities utilize the
classroom together.24
The guiding question for this project is: why does Brčko District have
multiethnic schools while other parts of the country do not, despite the shared
context of a consociational government? The answer lies in a different approach to
international intervention that took place in Brčko District and not in the rest of BiH.
The international intervention provided a clear and direct mandate of
responsibilities that needed to be fulfilled by the international community in Brčko
that did not occur anywhere else in BiH. International intervention moderated the
political system in Brčko District, which allowed for the creation of multiethnic
Anonymous. “Employee of Federal Ministry of Education and Science.” Personal
interview. 13 Jul. 2015.
23 Ibid.
24 Anonymous. “Education specialist of large IGO in BiH.” Phone interview. 10 Nov.
2015.
22
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schools that pride themselves on the principle of multiperspectivity25. The rest of
BiH did not experience this type of clear and directed international intervention, so
political extremism has become deeply rooted in the voting booth and in the
education system. This extremism can be seen in the monoethnic schools, the Twoin-One School program, and the continued election of the four major ethnonational
political parties, which will be discussed in greater depth later on.
The following discussion will focus on initially developing a better theoretical
understanding of consociationalism, and the importance of a moderate education
system. This paper provides an interesting dialogue by bridging the divide between
two very relevant fields of academic literature. There has been little work done on
how education systems are created in consociational democracies, which is what
this project hopes to bring to the table. The theoretical discussion will be used to
build a strong foundation for understanding how the theories have manifested
themselves within BiH. By understanding the theoretical framework in a
complicated political system like Bosnia it will be much easier to understand the
importance of this project. The analysis itself will show why a clear and direct
mandate issued by the international community was successful in moderating the
consociational government in Brčko District. Furthermore, it is also incredibly
important to acknowledge other existing claims on the discussion and other
possible solutions to the question, which have come about through individual
research and other academic research.

Multiperspectivity is defined in this paper as the process of utilizing a plurality of
discrepant viewpoints to achieve a well-informed understanding of any topic.
25
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The discussions on consociationalism and the importance of education for
moderation are nothing new to the academic field of post-conflict statebuilding.
However, few attempts have been made to bring the two bodies of literature
together to see whether and when a consociational democracy can produce a
multiethnic education system. This is because inherently it is illogical for
multiethnic education systems to exist in consociational democracies. By drawing
from two large academic fields the scope of the project is further narrowed into a
much smaller and far less discussed field that relates the importance of
international intervention in moderating the political and social extremism that
develops within the consociational model.
Much of the research that was gathered for this project was from fieldresearch in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the summer of 2015, which was funded
by the Senior Experience Mellon Grant from Lawrence University that I was
graciously awarded. The field research took me to Mostar, Sarajevo, Potkosa, Stolac,
and even Srebrenica. In addition, the grant also helped me get to Germany to visit
the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research (GEI), which is an
international non-governmental organization (INGO) that has helped support,
initiate, and monitor many post-conflict textbook reform processes. I had the
privilege of gathering research and utilizing BiH textbooks during my time there. In
addition, I was able to interview a retired director at GEI, who explicitly worked in
Bosnia on education reform. This experience was crucial and invaluable for the
completion for this project and for that I am incredibly grateful.
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During my time in BiH, I interviewed many high-ranking members of local
intergovernmental organizations (IGO), international organizations, civil society
groups, and even an interview with a member of the Federal Ministry of Education
all helped cultivate very large amounts of crucial information required for this
project. An education specialist for a regional IGO, Fikreta, and a local academic
researcher were also interviewed to gather much of the information related to
education. A local law professor also helped to solidify my understanding of the
Dayton Agreement, which proved to incredibly helpful. Many of these individuals
have chose to remain unnamed, so I am respecting their wishes by not providing
that information.
An immense amount of information, interviews, and data was gathered to
make this project possible; however, without the help of my project advisor, Ameya
Balsekar, none of this would have been possible. His wisdom was clear and ever
present, so thank you.
To begin, I want to set the stage and talk about the historical background of
former Yugoslavia and how the death of a leader led to the creation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.

A Brief History
The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia
On November 29th, 1943, Josip Broz or Tito founded the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).26 Under his rule Yugoslavism27 was readily present

Silber, Laura, and Allan Little. The Death of Yugoslavia. London: Penguin Books,
1996. 28. Print.
26
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and all ethnonationalism28 was suppressed. He dictated the country until his death
in 1980.29 Following his death the economy went into a free-fall, which comes with
widespread public dissatisfaction for the political system. Additionally, many people
demanded individual identity and shied away from Yugoslavism, which paved the
way for extreme nationalism in the respective countries that made up the SFRY. As a
result, this destabilized the political system with complete collapse in 1991 with the
secession of Slovenia and Croatia.30 Bosnia and Herzegovina quickly followed in
1992.31 Yugoslavia still remained with only Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo.
Turmoil in Bosnia and Herzegovina
In January 1992, Serb politicians in BiH declared a portion of Bosnia as the
“Republika Srpska” and voted on a referendum against Bosnia’s independence from
Yugoslavia.32 On April 6th, 1992 peace protests in Sarajevo against the conflict were
stopped by gunfire from the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS), and the Siege of
Sarajevo began.33
For the next three-and-a-half years a brutal conflict unfolded, which was
largely fought between the Bosniaks (Muslims), Croats (Catholics), and the Serbs
(Orthodox). After numerous failed attempts at diplomatic negotiations, NATO
became involved via concentrated airstrikes in late 1995 and a Bosniak-Croat land
Yugoslavism is national pride in Yugoslavia or brotherhood in socialist states.
Ethnonationalism is pride in one’s own ethnic identity, which divisive in a state
that wants equality and uniformity for all.
29 Silber, Laura, and Allan Little. The Death of Yugoslavia. London: Penguin Books,
1996. Print.
30 Ibid, 114-130.
31 Ibid, 205.
32 Ibid, 220.
33 Ibid, 222-224.
27
28
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offensive finally forced the Bosnian Serb forces to concede.34 This was all not
without the loss of over 100,000 people and the displacement of over 2,000,000
people.35
The High Representative and Dayton
Thankfully in November 1995, the U.S.-sponsored peace talks in Dayton, Ohio
led to the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement by representatives from Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro).36 The purpose of
the DPA is to promote peace and stability within BiH. In order to achieve
implementation of the DPA, the position of High Representative was created. Their
office, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), is responsible for supervising
and assisting in the peacebuilding process in BiH. It is “an ad hoc institution
overseen by a Peace Implementation Council (PIC) consisting of more than fifty
member states.”37 Initially, it had a very limited scope of powers until 1997 38 when
the PIC granted the OHR the “Bonn Powers,” which are “binding powers,” such as
the dismissal of politicians39 and the implementation of legislation40.41 The OHR is
Ibid, 370-380.
Ibid, 380.
36 Ibid, 364-378.
37 Moore, Adam. The Localized Dynamics of Peacebuilding. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2013.
53. E-Book.
38 The powers of the OHR were expanded because the international community
wanted to speed up the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. Local politicians
were blocking attempts by the OHR to implement the Dayton Agreement, so the
international community wanted to bypass this issue.
39 Politicians can be dismissed from their role without due process based on the
design of the Bonn Powers, which has been a serious issue of contention within BiH.
However, the OHR can also lift the ban on politicians, which has been occurring in
recent years.
40 The Assemblies can be bypassed by the OHR to implement legislation that is
consistent with their mission of implementing the Dayton Agreement.
34
35
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the primary international political presence in BiH, so for the purposes of this paper
whenever international community or international intervention is utilized this
office is what is being referred to.
In order to get all parties to agree to the terms of the DPA there had to be
some level independence since that was really what the conflict was about,
independent identity and self-identification. An agreement was made within the
DPA called the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL)42, which essentially solidified the
military fronts to create two autonomous entities within the borders of BiH. Map 1
illustrates the decentralized Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH, the
“Bosniak-Croat Federation”), which comprises about 51% of the territory and it is
further broken down into ten cantons that maintain almost all governmental and
financial responsibilities autonomously (5 Bosniak majority cantons43, 3 Croat
majority cantons44, and two are mixed45). The centralized Republic of Serbia (RS, the
Serb entity) comprises the other 49% of the territory where the entity government
is responsible for most tasks. BiH has one capital city, which is Sarajevo; however,
Sarajevo is also the de facto capital of the FBiH as the entity government is there,
while Banja Luka is the de facto capital of the RS for the same reason. In the end, one
final piece of land remained after the entities were created.
Brčko District, in northeastern Bosnia, was seriously argued over due to its
Office of the High Representative. PIC Bonn Conclusions. N.p., n.d. Web. 24 Dec.
2015. <http://www.ohr.int/en/pic-bonn-conclusions/?lang=en>.
42 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Annex 2. 30
Nov. 1995. Web. July 2015.
43 Una-Sana (Bihac), Tuzla, Zenica-Doboj, Bosnia-Podrinje (Gorazde) and Sarajevo
44 Posavina, West Herzegovina, and Canton 10 (known locally as Hercegbosanska
Canton)
45 Central Bosnia (Travnik) and Herzegovina-Neretva (Mostar)
41
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prime location in the country, as it would conjoin the two halves of RS and the two
halves of FBIH. It was agreed in the DPA46 that Brčko would be placed under the
authority of an International Arbitration Tribunal. Their responsibility would be to
reach a final decision on the status of the District of Brčko. During that year the
international community was tasked with bringing security to the region and when
the Tribunal finally did convene, neither side could agree on a final status.
The 1997, Rome Award, established an international supervisory body,
which would be led by the Principal Deputy High Representative 47 (Brčko
Supervisor, the Supervisor) for one year.48 The Supervisor was given "binding
regulations and orders," which would "prevail as against any conflicting law."
Furthermore, the 1998 Supplemental Award explained the justification for the
continued international intervention and confirmed the continued supervision by
the Supervisor.49 It also solidified the strength of the Supervisor and gave them
power equal to the Bonn Powers, which was awarded the year before50 to the High
Representative.
The Final Award in 1999 established the District of Brčko as a special
political unit within BiH. Neither entity would exercise political authority within the

General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Annex 2,
Article 5, Section 1. 30 Nov. 1995. Web. July 2015.
47 The Principal Deputy High Representative is the second-in-command at the OHR.
48 Lessons from Education Reform in Brcko. Rep. OSCE Mission to BiH Education
Department, Oct. 2007. 6. Web. 15 Jan. 2016.
49 Ibid.
50 The Bonn Powers were issued in 1997 and the Supplemental Award was issued in
1998.
46
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District.51 Brčko District is a jointly administered region by the entities, but remains
autonomous much like the cantons of the FBiH. The District’s roles, responsibilities,
and autonomy have been described as similar to that of Washington D.C. in the
United States.52 The OHR’s regime would continue until the District Supervisor
notified the Brčko Tribunal that the District's institutions are "permanent."
In the analysis, more detailed information will be discussed on how Brčko
District’s education system came into existence. In addition, the role and powers of
the OHR will be extensively discussed because it will be important to further the
point that different kinds of international intervention led to the different education
systems. Specifically, a clear and direct international mandate to the OHR Brčko led
to moderation of the education system, while no clear direction or mandates were
issued for the High Representative to extend to the rest of BiH.
Now that a strong historical base of events has been developed, a theoretical
framework can be built upon that base. This will serve as a model for how
consociationalism and moderate education theories fit together in the context of
BiH.

Final Award. Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute Over Inter-Entity Boundary in Brčko
Area. Article 2, Section 6. 5 March 1999. Web. April 2016. <http://19972001.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/990305_arbiter_brcko.html#_Toc44475
1801>
52 Anonymous. “Former high ranking governmental figure for international
organization.” E-mail. 26 Apr. 2016.
51
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Theoretical Underpinnings
The long and the short of it
After violent ethnic conflict the short-term goal is peacekeeping. This is
achieved through the design of political institutions and electoral systems. Getting
the various ethnic groups to agree on something is beneficial to promoting peace in
the region. This is why consociational models are typically used and are easier to
negotiate, as each group typically wants autonomy after conflict. The long-term
goals of statebuilding include stability and reconciliation amongst all people. This
can be achieved through the design of local institutions like the education system.
Design of consociational governments and the electoral system
As coined by Arend Lijphart, a consociational democracy is a power-sharing
democratic system or a fragmented system that is broken up along lines, such as,
ethnic, religious, or linguistic.53 The system is designed around proportional powersharing and ethnic autonomy.54 In order to achieve the proportional sharing of
power,

Lijphart

recommends

institutional

changes

like

a

proportional

representation electoral system, governing coalitions comprised of all major ethnic
factions, mutual group vetoes on major political issues and allocation of financial
resources, and civil service positions in proportion to ethnic membership in the

Lijphart, Arend. "Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration."
Canadian Journal of Political Science 4.1 (1971): 1-14. JSTOR. Web. 1 Oct. 2015.
54 Lijphart, Arend. “The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy.” The Architecture of
Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy. Ed. Andrew
Reynolds. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Print.
53
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country.55 Additionally, ethnic autonomy can be can be created through local
institutions like separate educational systems (schools, textbooks, curriculums),
independent cultural affairs councils, ethnically-based courts with jurisdiction over
family or religious laws and language rights policies such as separate broadcast
networks for different linguistic communities, or territorially, through the use of
ethnofederalism as in the case of Bosnia.56
The consociational approach encourages cooperation and coordination
between elites representing ethnic parties to achieve any legislation in the assembly
because no group has a majority.57 However, they do not need to do this, as groups
are autonomous within the greater state, so they may or may not choose to work
together. The whole system rests on the belief that the political elites will work
together, which will moderate the political system through their compromises and
creation of grand coalitions across ethnic lines. Countries like Switzerland, Belgium,
and Austria are all success stories of consociationalism.58
However, this system severely struggles if inter-group political parties refuse
to work together. It creates debilitating gridlock to the point of governmental
shutdown because if groups refuse to work together and no coalitions can be
created to achieve a majority rule then no legislation will be passed. Countries like

Lijphart, Arend. "Consociational Democracy." World Politics 21.2 (1969): 207225. JSTOR. Web. 3 Apr. 2016. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009820>.
56 Ibid.
57 Hulsey, John. "Electoral Accountability in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the
Dayton Framework Agreement." International Peacekeeping (2015): 1-16. 30 Oct.
2015. Web. 14 Mar. 2016. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2015.1100081>.
58 Lijphart, Arend. "Consociational Democracy." World Politics 21.2 (1969): 207225. JSTOR. Web. 3 Apr. 2016. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009820>.
55
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Cyprus and Nigeria have had to abandon the consociational model because
cooperation and moderation could not be achieved.59
Now, each of these ethnonational parties believes that they are “best”
representing their ethnic group. As Yash Pal Gai explains, “the system creates
incentives for parties and their leaders to intensify appeals to narrow ethnic
interests, linked to their kinfolk in other states, which does little for the unity of the
country.”60 Simply, the political parties only have incentives to become the most
extreme as the proportional representative system guarantees a one-third share of
seats in government. If there are fifteen seats available in an assembly and five are
reserved for Serbs then the ethnonational parties will only appeal to their ethnicity
because they are guaranteed those five seats. From the voter’s point of view, there is
no incentive to electing moderate, multiethnic parties because citizens believe that
moderate parties will not fight for their ethnicity and individuality like an extremist,
ethnonational party might.
According to Hulsey, consociational democracies are constantly evolving
because newer, stronger parties replace old, weak ethnonational parties.61 Since
voters are more likely to vote based on how hard that particular party will fight for

Lijphart, Arend. "Consociational Democracy." World Politics 21.2 (1969): 207225. JSTOR. Web. 3 Apr. 2016. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009820>.
60 Ghai, Yash Pal. “Constitutional Asymmetries: Communal Representation,
Federalism, and Cultural Autonomy.” The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional
Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy. Ed. Andrew Reynolds. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002. 149. Print.
61 Hulsey, John. "Electoral Accountability in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the
Dayton Framework Agreement." International Peacekeeping (2015): 1-16. 30 Oct.
2015. Web. 14 Mar. 2016. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2015.1100081>.
59
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their constituency it makes sense then that they will want fresh, new political
parties replacing their old ones.
Political institutions are important in achieving immediate compromise and
post-conflict peacekeeping in the short-term. That’s why power-sharing
democracies are typically implemented post-conflict, which is why consociational
governments have been created in countries like BiH, Nigeria, and Cyprus. However,
the traditional consociational model does not provide any institutionalized
incentives for ethnonational parties to gain support across inter-group parties nor
to gain voters outside of their own ethnic groups. The question now is: how can
consociational governments achieve long-term stability?
Designing a moderate education system
Long-term stability and reconciliation between previously warring parties
can be achieved through a multiethnic, and multiperspective education system.
Educational systems are designed to help socialize children into society; a moderate
education system is expected to instill political moderation. This is because if
children are learning to celebrate differences rather than to highlight and
discriminate against them then the political elites may see more opportunities for
compromise and coordination between inter-group parties. In a study by Padilla
and Ruiz, they explain that ethnic attitudes are formed early on in a child’s
development, so whether it is positive or negative prejudices then they will only
increase with time.62 With children being so impressionable it becomes extremely
Padilla, Amado M., and Rene A. Ruiz. Latino Mental Health: A Review of Literature.
Rockville: National Institute of Mental Health, 1973. Web.
<http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED088246.pdf>
62
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important to nurture civic values early on in a child’s development.
Education can be used in a constructive fashion and old methods of
marginalization of the “other” need to be abandoned. Bush and Saltarelli offer plenty
of ways that education can be used positively. They discuss topics like conflictdampening, desegregation of the mind, linguistic tolerance, cultivating inclusive
citizenship, and the disarming of history.63 These are all tools that can be used to
help the education system once again rebuild past relationship, be the source of
proper socialization for children, and be the moderating force in a consociational
government. These processes can be used to create a positive image of the “other”
and create a sense of trust between groups.
Multiperspectivity is another incredibly important idea within the
classroom.64 This technique utilizes a plurality of views and opinions in addressing
any topic, so that all sides from the conflict are represented to help foster the open
dialogue and reconciliation process.65 Multiperspectivity is also the process of
thinking deeply and critically about all possible viewpoints. K. Peter Fritzsche has
explained it as a “development of tolerance...able and willing to regard a situation
Bush, Kenneth D., and Diana Saltarelli. The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic
Conflict. N.p.: United Nations, 2000. UNICEF-IRC. Aug. 2000. Web. 7 July 2015.
<http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/insight4.pdf>.
64 Perry, Valery. Policy Note 10: Countering the Cultivation of Extremism in Bosnia
and Herzegovina: The Case for Comprehensive Education Reform. Democratization
Policy Council, Sep. 2015. 15-16. Web. Jun. 2015. <
http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/uimages/DPC%20Policy%20Note%2010%
20Extremism%20and%20Education%20in%20BiH.pdf>
65 Pingel, Falk. “From Ownership to Intervention – or Vice Versa? Textbook Revision
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Transition and the Politics of History Education in
Southeastern Europe. Ed. Augusta Dimou. Gottingen: V&R unipress, 2009. 285. Ebook.
<http://www.gei.de/fileadmin/gei.de/pdf/publikationen/Schriftenreihe/fulltext/S
Rfulltext124.pdf>
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from different perspectives…[and] a strategy for understanding.”66 This particular
approach in education can help to achieve a plural society that is accepting and
tolerant of all views, which is important for all societies as communities are
becoming more globalized. By incorporating this technique in the classroom it will
offer more ways for students to view their politicians and community leaders,
outside of what is being expressed at home, which is crucial in developing critical
thinking skills.
Education is invaluable in post-conflict communities because it can be used
to help reframe psychological trauma, help rebuild relationships by having all ethnic
groups together, help to create a common history and truth, and it can even be used
to help socialize children and adults back into the communities “new” value system.
These are all incredibly valuable assets that if not promoted through a strong
education can lead to what some call a “frozen conflict,” where the violence may
have come to a halt and animosity towards one another is still strong.67 When the
system is not fostering a positive outlook on other groups then there can be no
further advancement towards sustainable peace.
Tying consociational and educational theory together
Education is an extremely sensitive topic post-conflict. Especially when
Fritzsche, K. Peter. "Unable to Be Tolerant?" Podium-International Tolerance
Network (2000): 4. Web. Dec. 2015.
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and Herzegovina: The Case for Comprehensive Education Reform. Democratization
Policy Council, Sep. 2015. 15-16. Web. Jun. 2015. <
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education is so closely tied to national identity like history, language, and the arts.
As a result, it is very difficult to implement moderate education practices into postconflict communities. It becomes even more difficult in consociational governments
because each ethnic group is guaranteed a high-level of autonomy within the
political system. Each ethnic group has a right to have their own autonomous
education system under the consociational model. However, if for some reason
there is a desire to unify all the different education systems in a country then this is
possible through the creation of a grand coalition that must maintain a majority
control over the legislature to pass legislation.
So the historical base has been constructed along with theoretical framework
that has been developed on top of that base. Now, the two will be merged in the
discussion on how the consociational and educational theories have come to fruition
in BiH.
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A Look into Bosnia and Herzegovina
Consociational Design

Figure 1. Levels of Government68
The DPA identifies the people of BiH as “Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, as
constituent peoples (along with Others).”69 It is built around the idea of autonomous
ethnic communities.70 When arrangements are made for representation within the
government, the ethnic communities are used as the pieces that represent groups.71
These communities are the municipal level of government, which can be seen in
Figure 1. In BiH, the ethnic communities are the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs.

Bosnia Levels of Government. Digital Image. GlobalSecurity.org. Web. 29 April
2016. < http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_9818_figure1.gif>
69 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Web. July
2015.<http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BA_951121_Dayto
nAgreement.pdf>.
70 Ghai, Yash Pal. “Constitutional Asymmetries: Communal Representation,
Federalism, and Cultural Autonomy.” The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional
Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy. Ed. Andrew Reynolds. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002. 149. Print.
71 Ibid.
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Figure 1 shows the breakdown of the entire political system in both the FBiH
and RS. Each ethnic group is equally represented by a one-third proportional
representation at the cantonal, entity, and national levels. Each ethnic group is
guaranteed a minimum proportional representation at the local or municipal level,
which is based on a complicated mathematical formula that combines percentage
vote share and the 1991 census results. Each of the three Presidencies between the
national, FBiH, and RS have three Presidents that rotate through terms. For a
country of four million people, at any given time there are three Presidents and six
Vice-Presidents.
Since there is autonomy and no cooperation between each ethnic group,
there are a lot of redundancies across all levels of government. For example, there
are twelve different Ministries of Education (MoE) and another Education
Department in Brčko District. By design, these redundancies are institutionalized to
promote ethnic autonomy; however, “it is not sustainable”72.
Political parties
Each of the three ethnic groups in BiH has a dominant ethnonational party
that has been consistently winning elections since before the war. The Bosniaks
have the SDA. The Croats have the HDZ. The Serbs actually have two, the SDS and
SNSD. The SNSD has risen in power over the last ten years, which follows the
consociational design of poorly performing parties being replaced by newer,
stronger ones. The SDS is the old and poorly performing, but SNSD is the new strong
party that will go to more extremes to fight for their constituents. For example,
Anonymous. “Employee of Federal Ministry of Education and Science.” Personal
interview. 13 Jul. 2015.
72
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SNSD leader, Milorad Dodik, has been trying to have the RS secede from the FBiH to
join greater Serbia.73
Design of educational system
In the case of Bosnia, when it comes to education there is no national level
MoE, so each entity has an entirely different education policy and in the case of the
FBiH each canton has its own policy. In the two ethnically mixed cantons74, the
education policies are further devolved to individual schools and municipalities.75
Bosniak and Croat majority cantons will press a one-sided monoperspective
curriculum much like how the Serb majority, RS, will as well. The FBiH has an entitylevel MoE that has no real power, as education is an issue that is left up to the
cantons, so it serves only a coordination role between all the cantons.76 As a result,
the country has a total of 12 different MoEs along with a separate Education
Department in Brčko and with 13 distinctly separate curriculum (each canton, FBiH,
RS, Brčko) for a total of about 167,000 primary school students.77
Furthermore, the cantons are allowed to have “special relationships” with
other countries, so Croat cantons can have a relationship with Croatia and the same
goes for the RS and Serbia.78 This has been used for the importation of textbooks
Zuvela, Maja. "Biggest Serb Party in Bosnia Threatens 2018 Secession."Reuters.
Thomson Reuters, 25 Apr. 2015. Web. 09 May 2016.
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bosnia-serbs-secessionidUSKBN0NG0NB20150425>.
74 Central Bosnia (Travnik) and Herzegovina-Neretva (Mostar)
75 Anonymous. “Employee of Federal Ministry of Education and Science.” Personal
interview. 13 Jul. 2015.
76 Anonymous. “Employee of large IGO in BiH.” Personal interview. 28 Jun. 2015.
77 Ibid.
78 Anonymous. “Employee of Federal Ministry of Education and Science.” Personal
interview. 13 Jul. 2015.
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from those countries for their respective constituency.
Of the three major ethnic groups, every citizen has a right to learn in their
“mother tongue” and to learn “their” constituent people’s NGS education.79 Well, if
each school has an “ethnic flavor” then what happens to the student who is not a
part of that constituent group? Well, they can choose to go to a different school
where they fit the flavor better or they can choose to be assimilated to that
particular flavor. This has become an increasingly important issue with the
introduction of religion classes into the public school curriculum. For example,
there is an entirely Bosniak school near Stolac and a Serbian boy attends that school
because he is in that school district and his family cannot afford to drive him to
another school. He is assimilated into the entire school system, except for the
theology course. As this is a Bosniak school, Islam is the theology class where
students will learn various prayers, how to pray, and how to practice their religion.
The boy being an Orthodox Christian sits outside for 45 minutes until the class is
over, on a daily basis.80 Some may say that this is simply an act of respect for the
religion, which it could very well be. Although, could the time be better spent? Could
the class be more about world religions and learning about all different cultures, as
opposed to learning scripture?
Over time there have been some reform efforts that have taken place to
consolidate

responsibilities,

increase

coordination,

create

a

standardized

Ibid.
Anonymous. “Family with several children in Stolac.” Personal interview. 18 Aug.
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curriculum and textbook for the NGS, and to help integrate schools.81 For example,
the BiH Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA) has a small education agenda that serves as
a coordination role between all ten cantons, Brčko District, and the RS.82 The MoCA
has the power to implement legislation across all municipalities, cantons, and
entities; however, there is no political support or resources to allow for this to
happen.83
The Conference of Ministers of Education was designed to help the
coordination between all the ministers and so there could be more standardization
of textbooks, curriculum, and teacher training across cantons.84 Then there was the
state-level Education Agency that “was established to set basic curricular standards
based on learning outcomes”.85 The GEI created the “Common Core Curriculum,”
(CCC) which is a checklist of topics that teachers have to cover for each grade for
NGS topics.86 This is something that has managed to continue existing, as it serves as
a syllabus and not a manual on how to teach the material.
There are the numerous civil society organizations who have independently
sought to create teacher-training programs, textbook reform initiatives, programs
that “bridge the divide” between ethnic groups, before-and-after school programs,
and peace education studies. Valery Perry best summed up the state of all these
Anonymous. “Employee of large IGO in BiH.” Personal interview. 28 Jun. 2015.
Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Perry, Valery. "The Permanent Interim: Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Ongoing
Educational Crisis." E-International Relations (2014): n. pag. 24 Dec. 2014. Web. July
2015. <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/10/12/the-permanent-interim-bosnia-andherzegovinas-ongoing-educational-crisis/>
85 Ibid.
86Anonymous. “Retired employee of NGO and worked extensively on education
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programs when she said, “in the absence of the political will to make such bodies
work, not one of these bodies are truly independent, all suffer a lack of resources
and, most importantly, enforcement power.”87 The terrible truth is that “they only
work, while they are actively being implemented.”88 This is important because it
shows the reliance on the international intervention in training teachers, changing
textbooks, and curriculum, but the problem is that because there has been little
support to unify the education systems. Once the international involvement stops
then ethnic groups go back to being autonomous, which is entirely permissible
under the DPA. However, there is one program that has stood the test of time and
has been vigorously enforced by all levels of government.
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission to BiH
(OSCE) was responsible for BiH’s most well-documented program, which was the
Two Schools Under One Roof Program (2-1 Schools).89 The purpose of the program
was to help facilitate refugee return in divided communities, such as, Stolac and
most of the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton as it is a “mixed canton.”90 The mentality
was that even if the students are not in the same classroom or learning the same
material then they will at least be in the same building and it is a start to the
reconciliation process.91 It was supposed to be the first step in a much longer
Perry, Valery. "The Permanent Interim: Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Ongoing
Educational Crisis." E-International Relations (2014): n. pag. 24 Dec. 2014. Web. July
2015. <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/10/12/the-permanent-interim-bosnia-andherzegovinas-ongoing-educational-crisis/>
88 Anonymous. “Retired employee of NGO and worked extensively on education
reform in BiH. Responsible for creation of CCC.” Personal Interview. 12 Aug. 2015.
89 Anonymous. “Employee of large IGO in BiH.” Personal interview. 28 Jun. 2015.
90 Ibid.
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overhaul of the education system, but the system has continued to linger around
with no end in sight. Civil society groups like the Nansen Dialogue Centre (NDC)
have created “extra classes” to add between the passing periods of the two ethnic
groups, so both groups are together learning about a particular topic like
peacebuilding or citizenship. These programs can only do so much until there needs
to be a major overhaul of the education system to the extent that classrooms
become multiethnic.
Textbooks have also been a well-documented problem in BiH. They have
received significant help and many positive reforms have taken place. In 2004, the
Minister of Education and Culture of the RS, all the cantonal MoEs, and Education
Department of Brčko District adopted the “Guidelines for Writing and Evaluation of
History Textbooks for Primary and Secondary Schools in BiH” (The Guidelines).92 Its
goal was to provide everything necessary that a textbook should do for children. It
included points like using BiH as a main reference point, having all peoples
represented in an impartial manner, having the objective of reconciliation and peace
in BiH, and even including a multiperspective approach.93
A study published in 2008 by Dr. Heike Karge of the GEI looked at seven
different textbooks to see if they were meeting The Guidelines and they were met
with varying results. For instance, two textbooks utilized “hate speech” when talking
about events related to WW2 and these same two books utilized a “predominantly
Serbian history”, while another used Croatia as the main reference point, and
Anonymous. “Retired employee of NGO and worked extensively on education
reform in BiH. Responsible for creation of CCC.” Personal Interview. 12 Aug. 2015.
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92

31

another was using “hidden messages” throughout the text to incite an inflammatory
response from readers with opposing viewpoints about historical events.94 All hope
was not lost though as two of the books came close to the standard, while another
was also close, but “lacked consistency”. The problem of importing textbooks from
Croatia or Serbia has been a noted issue because those texts will naturally use their
host country as the focal point, even though it is permissible under Dayton.
The Unique Case of Brčko
Following the arbitration process, Brčko District started the multiethnic
unification of its schools in 2001.95 The integration process was completed in 2004
when all schools in Brčko District became multiethnic. This meant that going
forward all schools would be multiethnic and would have a diverse group of
students and teachers from all the constituent peoples teaching and learning
together. What are the implications? Simply put, Brčko has the only
multiperspective curriculum, multiethnic classrooms, and moderate educational
system in all of BiH.
The teachers will lecture in all three national languages, and they use at least
three different textbooks to present a multiplicity of perspectives to their
students.96 This is all regardless of the demographics of the classroom, so if there
Karge, Heike. 20th Century History in the Textbooks of Bosnia and Herzegovina: An
Analysis of Books Used for the Final Grades of Primary School. Georg Eckert Institute.
Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research, Apr. 2008. Web. June
2015.<http://www.gei.de/fileadmin/gei.de/pdf/abteilungen/schulbuch_und_gesell
schaft/Suedosteuropa/BiH_Schulbuchanalyse_Englisch.pdf>.
95 Moore, Adam. The Localized Dynamics of Peacebuilding. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2013.
E-Book.
96 Anonymous. “Education specialist of large IGO in BiH.” Phone interview. 10 Nov.
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are no Serb students in the class then the teacher will still lecture in Serbian along
with Bosnian and Croatian. Additionally, there is still a theology course much like
the rest of the country, but at the end of each academic year the parents have the
option to select what class their child will take.97 For instance, a Catholic family
could select an Orthodoxy course for their child. The OSCE has also created a
peacebuilding and citizenship course that can be taken in place of the theology
courses, which a lot of students have been taking.98
Now the entire foundation has been constructed from the discussions on the
theoretical underpinnings of consociationalism and education theory along with
how those theories have manifest themselves within BiH. Additionally, the historical
timeline is important to understand the sequencing of how everything occurred in
BiH. The following will solidify the question of: why does Brčko District have
multiethnic schools while other parts of the country do not, despite the shared
context of a consociational government?

Answers to the Guiding Question
How did Brčko’s education system come to be?
The role of the international community in the first years after Dayton was
reconstruction and peacekeeping. The education reform efforts were largely left to
civil society groups. An annex to the 1999 Final Award quickly changed that role. It
mandated that:
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"...the Supervisor will integrate the District's educational system,
harmonise curricula within the District, and ensure the removal of
teaching material which the Supervisor considers to be inconsistent
with the objective of creating a democratic, multi-ethnic society
within the District."99
This clear and direct mandate issued by the international community is what
has set Brčko District's long-term stability on a more effective path than the unclear
and lack of mandates for the rest of BiH. This is because education is only mentioned
in the Dayton Agreement in the context of education being a right of every citizen.
Outside of that there has been no direction given to the OHR except for making sure
that Dayton is successfully implemented. If by those standards then Dayton has been
successfully implemented.
Furthermore, the Final Award went on to sanction the formation of the Brčko
Law Review Commission, which sought to revise existing legislation to unify the
existing educational systems together.100 Between 1999-2001, the commission
drafted 40 laws, by-laws, and regulations.101 One of which was the Law on
Education, which effectively lays down a platform for integrating the schools. 102
The Law on Education was not well received by the students, their families,
and the community. Serb students and adults reacted violently against the Bosniaks
Annex to Brčko Final Award. Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute over Inter-Entity
Boundary in Brčko Area. 18 Aug. 1999. Web. April 2016. <
http://www.ohr.int/?ohr_archive=annex-to-brcko-final-award&lang=en&print=pdf>.
100 Lessons from Education Reform in Brcko. Rep. OSCE Mission to BiH Education
Department, Oct. 2007. 7. Web. 15 Jan. 2016.
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because of this.103 Thousands of Serb students took to the streets to demand that the
schools be separated, while the Bosniaks demanded increased security.104 It even
saw 13 Bosnian Serb delegates walk out of the Assembly during the voting,105 which
can be expected because each ethnic group is entitled to a vast amount of autonomy
within the consociational system. However, the Supervisor exercised his power to
impose the law because it was consistent with the mandate by the international
community to integrate the school system. Both the Law on education and the newly
developed curriculum were signed into effect on July 5, 2001.106
What happened in the rest of BiH?
It is important to understand that there has been international intervention
in the rest of BiH, but not as aggressive as it has been in Brčko District. Earlier the
international intervention in the education system in BiH was explained with the
role of the OSCE, the creation of the Guidelines for textbooks and curriculum, and
the creation of various councils to help increase the coordination between all the
different Ministers of Education.
Additionally, the OHR in Sarajevo extensively utilized their powers in the
beginning, but recently they have been utilizing their powers less and less. Between
1998-2004 there were 139 different politicians who were dismissed from public

Arnaut, Almir. "Bosnian Serb Students Protest Muslim Presence in
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office.107 There were 21 dismissed in 2002 and 7 in 2003, which is a sizeable
decrease in the dismissal of politicians.108 Additionally, between 1997-2004 there
were 67 laws imposed, but in 2002 only 28 laws were imposed and half as many in
2003.109 This pattern is consistent with the OHR's philosophy of creating more
"ownership" from the local population.110 The international community believes
that the locals have no sense of ownership over their government if laws and
politicians are being imposed or dismissed. As a result, a more “hands-off” approach
has been taken over the recent years by the OHR for the rest of BiH.
Why are the education systems different?
The difference between Brčko District and the rest of BiH is that the
international community provided a clear mandate (the Final Award and its
Annexes) for the Supervisor to follow and execute. To achieve this mandate, things
like the unification of the law occurred in order to achieve a unified education
system. The OHR in Sarajevo did not have any clear mandate outside of making sure
the Dayton Agreement was being effectively implemented, which did not give any
clear direction of responsibilities, or mandates. As a result, fruitless attempts have
been made with the existing institutions to unify the curriculum, textbooks, and
subsequent education system, which have no incentives to unify their education
systems. In Brčko, the Supervisor bypassed the Assembly to impose the unification
Shakhtakhtinskaya, Naira, and Laszlo Surjan. Honouring of Obligations and
Commitments by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Issue brief no. 10200. Council of Europe.
2004. Web. < https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=10559&lang=en>
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of the education system because the mandate that was given required this to
happen and was legally binding.

Competing Solutions
What are other possible explanations for the different education systems?
Going forward the purpose of the following section is to show other possible
arguments for the reason that Brčko District has a different education system
compared to the rest of BiH.
Different levels of Yugoslavism
To revisit the terminology that was introduced earlier on that Yugoslavism is
the strong anti-ethnonational support. More simply, it is citizen’s belief in the
former communist system. This is what academics like Adam Moore believe is the
reason why Brčko District’s education system is moderate, multiethnic compared to
the rest of BiH.
SDP (moderate, multiethnic political party) grew out of the former
communist party, SKBiH-SDP. Since SDP has been consistently gaining a plurality of
votes in Brčko District municipal elections and the particularly high levels of
Yugoslavism, then Brčko District has a moderate, multiethnic education system due
to more widespread social moderation.
The idea behind Moore’s argument is that if before the war there was strong
Yugoslavism, so strong support for SDP, and then it is more likely that a moderate
political system will emerge in those areas with the highest levels of pre-war
Yugoslavism. If SDP is likely to win in an area as a moderate party then they can help
to create multiethnic schools.
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According to the 1991 census,111 6.54% of citizens in Brčko District identified
themselves as Yugoslavs. 112 In the 2012 municipal elections, SDP gained a plurality
of votes with a 15.41% vote share.113 In addition to high levels of Yugoslavism and a
plurality election of SDP, Brčko District has multiethnic schools.
However, according to the 1991 census, 16.71% of citizens in Tuzla identified
themselves as Yugoslavs.114 In the 2012 municipal elections, SDP gained a plurality
of votes with a resounding 30.72% vote share.115 Compared to Brčko District, Tuzla
has a much higher level of pre-war Yugoslavism and SDP has gained a large plurality
of votes, but Tuzla has monoethnic schools. As a result, the presence of pre-war
Yugoslavism and a moderate political party like SDP gaining a plurality of votes do
not appear to have a large effect on the presence of a moderate education system.

The last recorded census in BiH was in 1991. There was one conducted in 2013,
but the results have yet to be published due to disagreements amongst ethnic
parties on how to count particular residences.
112Ethnic Characteristics of the Population. Oct. 1993. Raw data. Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Sarajevo.
<http://www.fzs.ba/Dem/Popis/Etnicka%20obiljezja%20stanovnistva%20bilten%
20233.pdf>
113 2012 Municipal Elections. Nov. 2012. Raw data. Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Sarajevo.
<http://www.izbori.ba/Rezultati/RezultatiPotvrdjeni/files/Lista_opstina_trka_9.ht
ml>
114 Ethnic Characteristics of the Population. Oct. 1993. Raw data. Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Sarajevo.
<http://www.fzs.ba/Dem/Popis/Etnicka%20obiljezja%20stanovnistva%20bilten%
20233.pdf>
115 2012 Municipal Elections. Nov. 2012. Raw data. Bosnia and Herzegovina,
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Different institutional designs
Moore argues that the design of local institutions in Mostar (severely
ethnically divided community in the HNK canton) and Brčko District have resulted
in different peacebuilding outcomes.116 He argues that the institutional framework
in Mostar solidified ethnic divisions, while the integrative model designed in Brčko
District has been more effective in mitigating conflict and attaining a multiethnic
government.117 Moore explains that the international community intervened in
Mostar to try and mediate negotiations by creating six different municipalities
within Mostar, but it ended up creating an even more divisive consociational
government than the rest of BiH.118 The difference between the institutional design
of Brčko District and Mostar is that Mostar is divided into six smaller municipalities,
while Brčko is one large municipality. They both maintain a consociational
government that prides itself in proportional representation and power-sharing.
The OHR was heavily involved in the creation of institutions within Mostar
much like in Brčko District; however, there were no clear or direct mandates that
were created to direct the peacebuilding processes of the OHR in Mostar like there
was in Brčko. There was heavy involvement by the OHR and the international
community in Mostar, Brčko District, and all of BiH. The reason why Brčko District
was able to achieve multiethnic schools is because the OHR had a clear and direct
mandate that they were legally obliged to follow unlike the rest of BiH.

Moore, Adam. The Localized Dynamics of Peacebuilding. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2013.
E-Book.
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Different financial influences
Moore posits the argument that different financial resources affected the
peacebuilding efforts between Brčko District and the rest of BiH. However, Moore
does a great job of explaining that this is not the case. Moore explains that the High
Representative, Paddy Ashdown, in 2006 estimated that “Bosnia had received $16
billion in aid since the end of the war. He calculated Brčko’s share to be only $70
million while Mostar had received an estimated $300–$400 million.”119
It was not the amount that Brčko District received, but how they received
those funds and how they were utilized. The funds were used in many ways one of
which was to implement a moderate and multiethnic education system.
The ethnic breakdown of Brčko
Another possible answer as to why Brčko District has a moderate education
system and the rest of BiH does not is because certain ethnic groups have better
reconciled their differences. Perhaps the larger population of Bosniaks in Brčko
District could be the reason why they have been able to succeed in creating a
moderate education system, while Croats and Serbs have not been able to. It’s an
interesting idea that is based on the principle that particular ethnic groups are more
extreme than others, which is why the rest of the country is being held back.
Perhaps for the fear of losing power if the consociational, power-sharing model
were to be abandoned. However, this idea also proves to be a mistake.

119

Ibid, 5.
40

According to the census conducted in 1991120, the ethnic breakdown of Brčko
District was Bosniaks (44.07%), Serbs (20.69%), Croats (25.39%), and rest is
comprised of smaller ethnic groups ranging from Montenegrins to Italians. Compare
that ethnic breakdown to another municipality in BiH like Tuzla and it will quickly
become apparent that this idea is not the answer. Tuzla was composed of Bosniaks
(47.61%), Serbs (15.40%), Croats (15.50%), and the rest like Brčko is also
composed of many smaller ethnic groups. Clearly, the ethnic breakdown in Tuzla is
very similar to that of Brčko District, but Tuzla still has monoethnic schools. This is
important to understand because it again shows that it is probably not likely due to
certain groups being more moderate than others.

Conclusion
In summary, this paper opens by highlighting the vast history associated with
the topic to show a strong understanding of the necessary information required to
speak about a complicated topic. The powers of the OHR and how Brčko came to be
were very diligently discussed. Then the discussion broadened into the literature on
consociationalism and the importance of moderate education systems. This serves
the purpose of developing a better understanding of the political theories associated
with the topic, so topics can be discussed later on in the paper. For example, the
discussion on the theory opens into a discussion of how the theory actually works in
BiH.

Since there was a large amount of displacement during the war, this could be
particularly difficult to test. However, once the newest census is released then the
results will be updated to reflect that new ethnic breakdown.
120

41

Lastly, the paper shows why a clear and directed mandate issued by the
international community is able to manifest itself into a multiethnic and moderate
education system. Then the opposing arguments are discussed to show their
relevance to the academic field and how they could certainly be plausible, but are
nowhere near as likely as this thesis.
To echo the words of Fikreta, “that’s just the way it is,”121 as they guided us into
the discussion by showing that monoethnic education systems are simply
commonplace in the consociational model; however, it is important to understand
that they don’t have to be. We have just seen that if the international community
really takes a strong hold of the peacebuilding and statebuilding processes then very
positive outcomes can develop.

Epilogue
In 2012, OHR suspended their supervisory powers in Brčko District and now
serve in an advisory capacity. All the institutions that were created through their
involvement still exist and a mass exodus has not happened. More importantly,
multiethnic schools still exist in Brčko. This is important because it shows that the
consociational government that exists in Brčko has been moderated by the
international intervention. Their intervention allowed for the creation of all these
wonderful institutions, which still exist after they left. A purely consociational
government, like the rest of BiH, cannot exist in moderation because there are no
incentives to do so; however, with the help of the international community it can.

Zaklan, Fikreta. "Stolac School Teacher Interview." Personal interview. 17 Aug.
2015.
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Figure 2. Attitudes to Dayton, by ethnicity, 2005-2015122
Looking forward, the citizens of BiH are not happy with their current
government and are not happy with Dayton, which can be seen in Figure 2. The
citizens feel as though “Dayton was necessary to end the war but now BiH needs a
new constitution to prepare for the EU”123. Something has got to give in BiH because
there is rampant unemployment, the youth are leaving the country, and the
economy is stagnant. Even if it is for selfish reasons to save one’s own group, but the
country and people will continue to suffer if something does not change.

Maraniss, David, and Robert Samuels. "20 Years after Dayton, Here’s What
Bosnians Think about Being Divided by Ethnicity." Washington Post. The
Washington Post, 2 Feb. 2016. Web. 18 Mar. 2016.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/02/20years-after-dayton-heres-what-bosnians-think-about-being-divided-by-ethnicity/>.
123 Ibid.
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